Key Point
- This case states the actus reus of battery: the touching of another person without consent, such consent may be implied where necessitated by daily life
Facts
- 2 police officers suspected D was soliciting for prostitution
- D walked away and the officer grabbed her arm
- D swore and scratched the officer’s arm
- D was convicted of assault on the officer
- Issue arose as to whether the officer had acted committed battery and thus acted in excess of her powers
Held (Divisional Court)
- Appeal allowed – D’s conviction was overturned
- The officer had committed battery and thus unlawfully detained D
Robert Goff LJ
- Any touching of another person, however slight, may amount to a battery
- However, given the broad principle, there must be exceptions, a broader exception is where there is implied consent for touching that is necessitated by the ‘exigencies of everyday life’
- An example is touching someone to gain their attention, but only when ‘using no greater degree of physical contact than is reasonably necessary in the circumstances for that purpose’
- In this case, because the officer’s action of restraining D ‘went beyond the generally acceptable conduct of touching a person to engage his or her attention’ and thus constituted a battery
Commentary
- As to why mere touching can constitute battery, Robert Goff LJ cited Blackstone’s Commentaries: “the law cannot draw the line between different degrees of violence, and therefore totally prohibits the first and lowest stage of it; every man’s person being sacred, and no other having a right to meddle with it, in any the slightest manner.”
Get tutored by top graduates from Oxbridge
Sign Up